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Abstract 23 
Artificial intelligence and robots may progressively take a more and more prominent place in our daily 24 
environment. Interestingly, in the study of how humans perceive these artificial entities, science has mainly 25 
taken an anthropocentric perspective (i.e. how distant from humans are these agents). &RQVLGHULQJSHRSOH¶V 26 
fears and expectations from robots and artificial intelligence, they tend to be simultaneously afraid and allured 27 
to them, much as they would be to the conceptualisations related to the divine entities (e.g. gods). In two 28 
experiments, we investigated the proximity of representation between artificial entities (i.e. artificial 29 
intelligence and robots), divine entities, and natural entities (i.e. humans and other animals) at both an explicit 30 
(Study 1) and an implicit level (Study 2). In the first study, participants evaluated these entities explicitly on 31 
positive and negative attitudes+LHUDUFKLFDOFOXVWHULQJDQDO\VLVVKRZHGWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI32 
artificial intelligence, robots, and divine entities were similar, while the representation of humans tended to 33 
be associated with that of animals. In the second study, participants carried out a word/non-word decision 34 
task including religious semantic-related words and neutral words after the presentation of a masked prime  35 
referring to divine entities, artificial entities, and natural entities ±(or a control prime). Results showed that 36 
after divine and artificial entity primes, participants were faster to identify religious words as words compared 37 
to neutral words arguing for a semantic activation. We conclude that people make sense of the new entities 38 
by relying on already familiar entities and in the case of artificial intelligence and robots, people appear to 39 
draw parallels to divine entities. 40 
 41 
Highlights: 42 
x Artificial Intelligence and robots share common representations with divine entities 43 
(e.g. gods)  44 
x Artificial Intelligence and robots, similar to divine entities, are conceptualized as 45 
non-natural entities with high power over human life. 46 
x These common representations relies on conceptual semantic proximity at the 47 
explicit and implicit level 48 
Keywords: artificial intelligence, robots, gods, semantic representation, perception of 49 
robots 50 
 51 
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God-like robots: The semantic overlap between representation of divine and artificial entities 55 
1. Introduction 56 
Along with the evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic technology, behaviours 57 
and public beliefs toward these new entities are also constantly being refined. Despite this, social 58 
sciences have been slower to answer some of the key questions regarding human-machine 59 
interactions questions, which may not be a priority to the same extent as the developers of the 60 
new technologies. The purpose of the present research, then, is to advance our knowledge of 61 
how people perceive AI and robots DQGKRZWKHVHHQWLWLHVPD\EHUHSUHVHQWHGLQSHRSOH¶VPLQGV. 62 
In line with Eypley, Waytz and Cacciopo (2006), we propose that because both AI and robots are 63 
a relatively new addition to our societies, people may use their existing knowledge of other non-64 
human figures to build a cognitive representation of AI in their minds. Specifically, the present 65 
research investigated whether people¶VH[SHULHQFHVRIanger, disappointment, and positive affect 66 
towards AI and robots are cognitively linked to already accessible representations of other 67 
figures, such as gods, animals, and humans. Both AI and God are abstract in their existence and 68 
are not bound by physical architecture of human bodies, allowing them to have powers beyond 69 
human abilities. AI technology is increasingly eager to transcend human boundaries (Segal, 70 
1998). Robots, on the other hand, although they are artificial in the same way as the AI, may be 71 
cognitively represented similar to other embodied creatures, such as humans or animals. Further 72 
evidence for this association is tested by investigating the semantic link between those entities. In 73 
sum, the present research advances knowledge on the ways in which AI and robots, despite both 74 
being products of the same wave of technological progress, may be represented distinctly in 75 
human minds. 76 
1.1 Thinking about entities 77 
 4 
Surrounded by an abundance of information, human mind has a limited attention to 78 
process all of the social stimuli available (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). For this reason, people 79 
simplify the world and use proxy information to guide their thoughts and behaviour. When 80 
meeting new individuals, stereotypes within a certain social category become a primary source of 81 
information to allow people to make more rapid decisions and infer attitudes instantly (Krauss & 82 
Hopper, 2001). As such, knowing some general characteristics of these groups is an adaptive 83 
way of navigating complex environments. These stereotypes may be ambivalent in a way that a 84 
member of a certain social group can be evaluated positively on one trait, but negatively on 85 
another (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).  86 
However, psychological sciences are not just concerned with human-human relations, but 87 
increasingly interested in how people think about other non-human entities, such as gods 88 
(Gervais, 2013) or animals (Caviola, Everett, & Faber, 2018). When encountering figures or 89 
phenomena other than humans, people rely on schemas to organise their experience to guide 90 
their thoughts and behaviours (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). People naturally attempt to create new 91 
meanings by associating people, objects, and even ideas (Krystal, 2006). Crucially, if these 92 
happen to be new elements that do not have a place in the current understanding of the world, 93 
people reaffirm their existing meaning-providing frameworks (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). With 94 
technological objects like robots or AIs, people may find it unsettling when they work in 95 
unpredicted ways. The solution to this unpredictability appears to be resolved by attributing 96 
human characteristics and stereotypes to assert robots or AIs intentionality (Epley, Waytz, & 97 
Cacioppo, 2007; Hegel, Krach, Kircher, Wrede, & Sagerer, 2008; Nass & Moon, 2000).  98 
Given that the everyday direct exposure to technological agents is somewhat limited and 99 
FHUWDLQO\QRWDVDOLHQWSDUWRISHRSOH¶VOLYHVconceptual knowledge about these entities is not 100 
necessarily formed from prior experiences but rather from fictional stories like films and TV shows 101 
(Polkinghorne, 2013; Rossiter, 1999). For this reason, the uncertainty surrounding these entities 102 
can be high and people may use the only representation available at their disposal: fictional 103 
representations to reduce unpredictability (Appel, 2008; Appel & Mara, 2013). Over time, these 104 
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fictional representations may become stable and reliable depictions when they have to think 105 
about AIs and robots (Epley et al., 2007). 106 
1.2 Artificial intelligence: Salvation and destruction  107 
Lay people and experts have a varied understanding of what AI consists of (Lawless, 108 
Mittu, Russell, & Sofge, 2017). Lay pHRSOH¶VEHOLHIVUHJDUGLQJ $,¶Vcapacities, control, or limits 109 
tend to be driven by popular culture more so than the current state of knowledge on the topic 110 
(Mara & Appel, 2015), which is not the case for the experts. Despite this, there are various 111 
attitudes towards what sort of contribution AI brings to our societies. Prominent scientists have 112 
expressed their doubts regarding the bright future of humans co-existing with the AIs. For 113 
example, Stephen Hawking referred to ³WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIIXOODUWLILFLDOLQWHOOLJHQFH>DVWKH114 
potential] end of the human race´- which could take over its own destiny without the input of 115 
humans (Stephen Hawking at the BBC,  2014) - as a cataclysmic invention (Geraci, 2008). 116 
Conversely, more optimistic scientists pursue a rhetoric portraying the AIs as an extension of 117 
humanity, arguing that AI is a way to transcend the human nature (Geraci, 2008; Helbing et al., 118 
2019). One example of this would be by enhancing KXPDQ¶V cognitive capacities (Salomon, 119 
Perkins, & Globerson, 2007). 120 
This ambivalence of seeing technology both as a threat and as a contribution to our 121 
societies is reflected in findings regarding public perceptions of AI: while they remain largely 122 
optimistic and positive, there is some concern over loss of control over AI (Bostrom, 2003; 123 
Vimonses, Lei, Jin, Chow, & Saint, 2009). Therefore, on one hand, the development of AI may be 124 
perceived as a positive addition to our civilisation, but on the other hand, there are clearly fears 125 
surrounding these developments. Given the power and appeal of AI, their mental representations 126 
in the human mind could resemble those of divine entities in that sense (Geraci, 2008). The 127 
author proposed that when thinking about divine entities, the fear of the omnipotent nature of 128 
gods and the simultaneous allure of their omnipotence exist side by side. Notably, these two 129 
concepts are not opposition to each other, but rather enforce one another as the perceived power 130 
of the gods is increased. Indeed, people tend to view God as punitive on one hand, having power 131 
over the ultimate fate of humans, and benevolent on the other hand (Adee, 2018; Stroope, 132 
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Draper, & Whitehead, 2013). Moreover, people ascribe agency to gods, possessing power which 133 
exceeds human abilities (Menary, 2010). The nature of this power, much like in the case of AIs, is 134 
ambiguous as gods could potentially use it  either for the benefit of humans or against them (Gray 135 
& Wegner, 2010). It would be expected that because of the close conceptual overlap between 136 
divine entities and AI, people may be inclined to attribute similarly ambivalent constructs of power 137 
of divine figures to AI. Likewise, simultaneous fear of and attraction towards this perceived power 138 
outside human ability could implicitly enable cognitive associations of AI to divine figures. In 1912, 139 
Durkheim proposed a dichotomy between the concepts of profane and sacred. One might be 140 
tempted to define concepts belonging to the "sacred" by the place generally assigned to them in 141 
the hierarchy of beings (Durkheim, 1912). According to Durkheim, while this hierarchical 142 
distinction is a criterion that seems too general and imprecise, there remains a significant 143 
conceptual heterogeneity. What makes this heterogeneity sufficient to characterize this 144 
classification of things is its absolute character. Indeed, there is no other example in the history of 145 
human thought of two such profoundly different categories of things so fundamentally opposed to 146 
each other. 7KH³VDFUHG´LV readily considered superior to secular things and particularly to man 147 
that has, by himself, nothing sacred. While Durkheim has discussed religion and divinity as 148 
sacred, the AI, too, does not follow the mundane physical constraints placed onto human beings. 149 
Another claim of Durkheim is that if the human depends on the sacred through the hierarchical 150 
relationship, this dependence is reciprocal and the sacred is made by the human which create it 151 
as sacred. This approach is transcribable to AI that are perceived, in the general audience, with a 152 
potential power superior to humans but still dependent on human bodies. For these reasons, AI, 153 
more so than other non-human entities such as animals could be more readily perceived to be 154 
associated to the sacred similar to divine entities. However, whether such an association exists 155 
has not been tested by the research to date. 156 
1.3 Robots: an embodied technology 157 
Similar to AI, the perception of the impact of robots on our society is ambiguous as it is 158 
mainly driven by science fiction (Sundar, Waddell, & Jung, 2016) and the media (Bartneck, 159 
Suzuki, Kanda, & Nomura, 2007; Mara & Appel, 2015; Tatsuya Nomura, Suzuki, Kanda, & Kato, 160 
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2006). While there is a fear of being replaced, for example, via automatisation (Syrdal, 161 
Dautenhahn, Koay, & Walters, 2009), people also see robots as companions, carers, and new 162 
social partners (Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn, Te Boekhorst, & Koay, 2008). However, in contrast 163 
to AI, robots tend to have an embodied structure that could liken them to humans (Bainbridge, 164 
Hart, Kim, & Scassellati, 2011; Mara & Appel, 2015). Therefore, robots, can be considered like AI 165 
in an interactive physical body and as more grounded, and consequently, in less abstract terms 166 
(Nyangoma et al., 2017). A physical body itself does not guarantee positive attitudes, as robots 167 
that are too human-like can be disturbing (Kaplan, 2004). This embodied structure encourages 168 
people to attribute more human characteristics to robots than other non-embodied entities 169 
(Breazeal, 2004). The process of attributing human characteristics to a piece of technology but 170 
also to animals or divine entities is called anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 2007; Martin, 1997; 171 
Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Reeves, & Leshner, 1996). Under certain conditions, however, robots 172 
are seen more as tools than human-like. An example of this is when robots are not involved in an 173 
interaction or when they behave in a predictable manner (Epley et al., 2007; Häring, 174 
Kuchenbrandt, & André, 2014; Riether, Hegel, Wrede, & Horstmann, 2012; Spatola et al., 2018).  175 
Thus, it is the social interaction with robots that enables people to attribute uniquely 176 
human traits to robots, thereby granting them a moral status (Spatola et al., 2018; Waytz, 177 
Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). Indeed, when people deprive 178 
others of their human qualities, they can do so in two distinctive ways: mechanistic and 179 
animalistic (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). In the case of attributing someone with 180 
mechanistic qualities, they resemble more general characteristics associated with robots and 181 
technology. In this way, there may be some overlap between how some people can be perceived 182 
as cold or superficial in the same way that robots are considered. Animalistic qualities, on the 183 
other hand, can be attributed to people who appear to lack civility in the same ways that animals 184 
do. Research has shown that robots were dehumanised in mechanical and not animalistic ways 185 
(Spatola et al., 2019). Dehumanisation of humans, however, is achievable in both ways. At the 186 
same timeLWLVQRWFOHDUZKHWKHUSHRSOH¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIURERWVQHFHVVDULO\RYHUODSZLWK187 
those of humans in general and of animals. Thus, we propose to investigate whether robots are 188 
perceived by lay people as closer to AI (and potentially divine entities) on the two dimensions of 189 
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fear and allure because of their artificial origin (Mara & Appel, 2015) or closer to human and 190 
animals in a more naturalistic perspective because of their embodied structure and humanlike 191 
conceptual representation (Goetz, Kiesler, & Powers, 2003; Wainer, Feil-Seifer, ShelO	0DWDULü192 
2006). It has been shown that the physical embodiment of a robot compared to an avatar 193 
enhances social presence, especially in a face-to-face interaction (Bainbridge et al., 2011; Sirkin 194 
& Ju, 2012; Tanaka, Nakanishi, & Ishiguro, 2014). Also, the physical presence of a socially 195 
interactive robot seems to elicit the same effect on human cognition that the presence of a human 196 
does, increasing the level of perceived anthropomorphism of the robot (Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, 197 
2012; Riether et al., 2012; Spatola et al., 2019, 2018). This further demonstrates that robots can 198 
be seen as physical agents close to humans, which is not the case for AI that are rather 199 
characterized by intangibility. 200 
1.4 The present research  201 
The aim of the present research was to investigate the respective overlap between 202 
artificial entities (AI and robots) and natural entities (i.e., humans and animals) or divine entities 203 
(i.e., gods). Study 1 used correlational methods to establish the nature of the representations 204 
across these five entities and was explorative in nature. Using the data from Study 1, we then 205 
constructed hypotheses for Study 2 to verify the overlap in semantic representation between gods 206 
and artificial entities. Data for Study 1 and 2 are available via Open Science Framework: 207 
https://osf.io/uzpjn/?view_only=d60c61b847a14d1cb3a0aa8ef6172391 208 
2. Study 1 209 
In the first study, we aimed to evaluate the extent to which similar positive and negative 210 
traits are attributed to divine entities, artificial intelligences, robots, humans, and animals. Given 211 
the conceptual similarities of divine entities and AI, we expect that people may evaluate these two 212 
entities similarly and that robots and AI should be comparable due to their shared technological 213 
origin. Humans and animals should be perceived as different from the three others entities 214 
because of their natural and embodied aspects. Finally, because of the URERWV¶215 
anthropomorphism process, robots should be seen as relatively close to humans.  216 
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Importantly, as we were concerned with artificial entities (AI and robots), we included a 217 
measure of technological readiness. Technology can be a source of anxiety (Heerink, Kröse, 218 
Evers, & Wielinga, 2010) or positive expectations (Wiederhold, Baños, Botella, Gaggioli, & Riva, 219 
2011) depending on the general attitude towards technology (Bartneck et al., 2007; Heerink et al., 220 
2010; Parasuraman, 2007). As such, SHRSOH¶VJHQHUDODWWLWXGHWRZDUGs technology could affect 221 
their positive or negative evaluation of AIs and robots. We expected that people declaring 222 
optimism towards technology would be more willing to develop positive attitudes toward AIs and 223 
robots while a high technological discomfort would be related to more negative evaluations (Lin & 224 
Hsieh, 2007; Parasuraman, 2007). 225 
2.1 Methods1 226 
2.1.1 Participants. Participants were 76 psychology students at a French university (8 227 
male, 63 female and 5 others, Mage = 19.07, SD = 2.30) who completed an online survey.2. Items 228 
within each scale were presented randomly and each of the following measures were further 229 
randomised. 230 
2.1.2 Positive and Disappointment/Anger attitudes. To evaluate positive and 231 
disappointment/anger attitudes towards (1) divine entities, (2) artificial intelligence, (3) robots, (4) 232 
humans, and (5) animals, we used an adapted version of the Attitudes toward God Scale (Exline 233 
et al., 2010). To measure the positive attitudes, participants responded to six items (such as 234 
³&RXOG\RXWUXVW>the HQWLW\@WRSURWHFW\RXDQGWDNHFDUHRI\RX"´) on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 235 
7 (completely). A further four items (such as ³&RXOG\RXVHH>HQWLW\@DVEDG"´) measured feelings 236 
of disappointment and anger attitudes towards those entities. Disappointment and anger 237 
emotions were DSDUWRIWKHVDPHVXEVFDOHDQGWKXVZHUHIHUWRWKHPDVµQHJDWLYHHPRWLRQV¶238 
more generally for the sake of simplicity. The positive and negative items were collapsed into two 239 
                                                   
1 In addition, we used the Individualism and Collectivism scale (Triandis & Gelfland, 1998), which is 
not reported in this paper 
2 At the end of the experiments, all participants had to evaluate their knowledge about artificial 
LQWHOOLJHQFHDQGURERWVRQD³QRWDWDOO´WR³,¶PDSURIHVVLRQDO´VFDOH5HVXOWVVKRZHGWhat all 
participants were set in the lower quantile of the scale. 
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separate variables and showed overall good internal reliability across all entities (Divine entities: 240 
Į3positive = .90Įdisappointment = .78; $,VĮpositive Įdisappointment  5RERWVĮpositive = .80; 241 
Įdisappointment = .70+XPDQVĮpositive Įdisappointment = .66$QLPDOVĮpositive Įdisappointment = 242 
.70). 243 
2.1.3 Technology readiness. Participants also completed the Technology Readiness 244 
Index scale (Parasuraman, 2007; Parasuraman & Colby, 2015), which measured their propensity 245 
to embrace and use of technologies in general and cutting-edge technologies in particular. The 246 
measure consists of four subscales: optimism ³Technology gives people more control over their 247 
daily lives´), innovativeness ³You keep up with the latest technological developments in your 248 
areas of interest´), discomfort ³New technology makes it too easy for governments and 249 
companies to spy on people´), and insecurity ³You do not consider it safe giving out a credit card 250 
number over a computer´). Each item was scored on a Likert scale from 1 (strong disagreement) 251 
to 7 (strong agreement). All four subscales had an acceptable level of internal reliability Įoptimism = 252 
Įinnovativeness Įdiscomfort Įinsecurity = .82). 253 
2.1.4 Participants expertise.  At the end of the experiments, all participants had to 254 
HYDOXDWHWKHLUNQRZOHGJHDERXWDUWLILFLDOLQWHOOLJHQFHDQGURERWVRQD³QRWDWDOO´WR³,¶PD255 
SURIHVVLRQDO´VFDOH 256 
2.2 Results 257 
2.2.1 Clustering. We first conducted a hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis 258 
(Caliñski & Harabasz, 1974) using the Ward method to explore the associations between positive 259 
and negative attitudes toward divine entities, artificial intelligences, robots, humans, and animals 260 
(Davis, 2009). Hierarchical clustering is a bottom-up approach for grouping objects based on their 261 
similarity. Using this analysis, we created a dendogram: a multilevel hierarchy tree-based 262 
representation of objects where clusters at one level are joint together to form the cluster at the 263 
                                                   
3 &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDRUĮLVDVWDWLVWLFXVHGLQSV\FKRPHWULFVWRPHDVXUHWKHUHOLDELOLW\RITXHVWLRQV
DVNHGGXULQJDWHVW$UHOLDEOHĮLVVXSHULRUWR(Brown, 2002; Cronbach, 1951). 
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next levels (see Figure 1). The dendrogram is a visual representation of the compound correlation 264 
data. The closer the concepts, the shorter the distance. 265 
 266 
Fig. 1. Hierarchical clustering dendogram of positive and negative attitudes toward divine entities, 267 
artificial intelligences, robots, humans and animals. The height of each node is proportional to the 268 
level of dissimilarity between categories. 269 
According to the combined rescaled distance cluster, we found that the AI and robots 270 
were considered as similar on both positive (B=.84, t(75)=13.94, p<.001, Șðp=.73) and negative  271 
attitudes (B=.85, t(75)=12.36, p<.001, Șðp=.68), creating a common cluster we call µartificial 272 
entities¶. This cluster was further close to the positive (B=.17, t(75)=2.38, p=.020, Șðp=.07) and 273 
negative attitudes toward divine entities (B=.61, t(75)=7.32, p<.001, Șðp=.43). Another cluster 274 
consisted of positive and negative attitudes toward humans (³KXPDQFOXVWHU´B=.28, t(75)=3.01, 275 
p=.004, Șðp=.11), which was distinct from that of the artificial and divine entities (B=.01, t(75)=.09, 276 
p=.927, Șðp<.01). Moreover, the human cluster was linked to the negative attitudes towards 277 
animals, creating D³natural entities´FOXVWHU (B=.312, t(75)=6.45, p<.001, Șðp=0.36). Positive 278 
attitudes towards humans and animals were, however, not related (B=.103, t(75)=1.71, p=.091, 279 
Șðp=0.04). This can be explained by the fact that the positive and negative attitudes towards 280 
animals were independent of each other, (B=-.017, t(75)=-.18, p=.858, Șðp<0.01). In sum, this 281 
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analysis demonstrates the overlap in representations of artificial entities and divine entities, with 282 
humans and animals represented dissimilarly from this cluster.  283 
2.2.2 Technological readiness. We conducted a regression analysis including these four 284 
dimensions of technological readiness as predictors of positive and negative attitudes towards 285 
each entity.  286 
2.2.2.1 Innovativeness. Interestingly, we found that disappointment/anger attitudes were 287 
predicted by the increased support for innovation of participants. Higher interest in technology 288 
was related to more negative attitudes towards AI (B=.52, t(75)=2.20, p=.031, Șðp=.06), robots 289 
(B=.504, t(75)=2.28, p=.026, Șðp=0.07), and divine entities alike (B=.59, t(75)=2.58, p=.012, 290 
Șðp=.09). This result was also significant for the artificial entities cluster combining AI and robots 291 
(B=.513, t(75)=2.31, p=.024, Șðp=0.07). We conducted a post-hoc analysis to investigate whether 292 
our participants were polarized in term of interest for technology. A one simple T-test comparing 293 
WKHDYHUDJHVFRUHRISDUWLFLSDQWVWRWKHWKHRUHWLFDOPHDQRIWKHVFDOHVKRZHGWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶294 
score was significantly lower than the theoretical mean (t(75)=-4.69, p<.001, 95%CI [-.73, -.30]). 295 
2.2.2.2 Optimism, Insecurity and Discomfort. These two subscales did not significantly 296 
predict positive or negative attitudes towards any entity (all ps > .05). 297 
2.2.2.3 Participants expertise. Results showed that all participants were set in the lower 298 
quintile of the scale. They were all laymen on this topic. 299 
2.3 Discussion  300 
Study 1 showed that the concepts of robots and AI were related to that of the divine 301 
entities in terms of the positive and negative traits people attribute to them. Moreover, this cluster 302 
seems to be independent of another cluster including natural entities, such as humans and 303 
animals. This result is in line with the trend to explicitly discriminate supernatural minds from 304 
human minds (Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz & Young, 2016). Thus, according to clustering, the 305 
representation of AI and robots, that is artificial entities and similar to divine entities, differs from 306 
the representation of natural entities. These results echo Durkheim¶V proposal with a natural and 307 
non-natural cluster, or a profane and sacred cluster respectively (Durkheim, 1912). However, the 308 
 13 
measure we utilised in the present study is quite specific in terms of the range of attitudes 309 
assessed and may not be sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the representations of artificial 310 
and divine entities are linked. The second study aims to answer this issue. 311 
We also found a negative link between attitude toward innovation and attitudes toward 312 
artificial and divine entities cluster. While our participants seems lacked interested in technology, 313 
it seems that this factor may energize a modulation on artificial and divine entities perception. 314 
Indeed, Epley and colleagues (Epley et al., 2007) posit that the knowledge about non-human 315 
entities reduces the uncertainty about their true nature and thus, the attribution of unrelated 316 
characteristics (Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, 2011) ZKLFKVXSSRVHDQDFFHVVLELOLW\WRWKH³VDFUHG´317 
nature of artificial agents . Interestingly, in our results the more participants showed a high level of 318 
interest toward technology, the more he/she seemed believe in the negative power of AI and 319 
robots. This effect could be explain by the relative level of knowledge compare to a specific 320 
knowledge about these entities. Indeed, knowing a little can be worse than knowing nothing at all. 321 
On these topics, lay people reading non-scientific paper press or watching news could be 322 
misguided about the actual state of arWLILFLDODJHQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHV)RULQVWDQFHWhe cultural 323 
representation of ³artificial LQWHOOLJHQFH´tend to be DVVLPLODWHGWR³artificial FOHYHUQHVV´ which is, in 324 
fine, overused. Thus, to know a little could be worst than knowing nothing at all because, in this 325 
context, the popularization on this topic is often too alarmist granting artificial agents with 326 
excessive skills and abilities, often under the prism of danger to humans. In 2016, Müller and 327 
Bostrom conducted a study about the potential future of AI with the opinion of experts (Müller & 328 
Bostrom, 2016). Their results showed a positive bias regarding the overall impact on humanity in 329 
H[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQVTherefore, further research should investigate the distance modulation 330 
between- and within-clusters according to the level of knowledge and specific interest or expertise 331 
about artificial agents. We could assume than expert should be less willing to attribute high levels 332 
of powers to artificial agents because of their knowledge about their internal functioning granting 333 
them with a feeling of control (Haggard, 2017; Pacherie, 2015). 334 
3. Study 2 335 
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Having established an association between mental representations of artificial entities and 336 
divine concepts, it is still not clear whether this link is superficial and dependable on the specific 337 
criteria that were set out (e.g., judging AI and robots on a specific scale) or whether it is grounded 338 
in a stable implicit cognitive association. If a semantic association between the two exists, it 339 
would demonstrate that artificial entities and divine entities rely on the same associations and 340 
semantic network, beyond an explicit simplistic overlap in their representations. In order to 341 
investigate whether there is an implicit cognitive overlap between divine and artificial entities, we 342 
designed a lexical decision task using divine and non-divine semantically related words in a 343 
masked prime paradigm. Masked prime paradigm allows activation of semantic categories by 344 
encouraging processing of the meaning of the word more deeply because of the degradation of 345 
the stimuli (Akhtar & Gasser, 2007; Madden, 1988). When a priming stimulus and a target word 346 
are semantically related, participants are faster in making a decision regarding the target word 347 
than when both stimuli are unrelated (Akhtar & Gasser, 2007; Balota, Yap, & Cortese, 2006; 348 
Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Dehaene et al., 1998; Fazio, Jackson, 349 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Neely, 1977; Rugg, 1985).  350 
Given the evidence regarding the relationship between artificial and divine entities in 351 
Study 1, we hypothesised that people would perform better in recognising words from the divine 352 
semantic category following the congruent activation of the divine and artificial entities categories. 353 
Lower response times would be expected when identifying divine-related words as real words 354 
compared to neutral words when participants are primed by the artificial entity and divine entity 355 
categories as a result of semantic congruence (see Cree, McRae, & McNorgan, 1999; 356 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Lucas, 2000; Thompson-Schill, Kurtz, & Gabrieli, 1998). 357 
This difference should not occur for the control primes involving natural entity and the neutral 358 
word categories.  359 
3.2 Method 360 
Participants were 27 women and 22 men (Mage = 23, SD = 10) from France who were 361 
right-handed and with normal or corrected vision. They participated voluntarily. In a lexical 362 
decision task, participants were asked to judge whether the target stimuli was a real word or not 363 
 15 
XVLQJµ<HV¶RUµ1R¶NH\VRQWKHNH\ERDUG. All stimuli were presented in French using Arial font size 364 
18. There were 12 words related to religious concepts (e.g., µsanctuary¶) and 12 neutral words 365 
(e.g., µsilhouette¶), which were chosen by the researchers. Specifically, religious and neutral 366 
words were chosen carefully to control for word frequency according to the number of occurrence 367 
in films subtitles (Brysbaert, Lange, & Van Wijnendaele, 2000), number of letters, and number of 368 
syllables (New, Pallier, Ferrand, & Matos, 2001). We also conducted a pretest with 20 369 
participants to ensure the religious semantic activation of religious words4. Participants also saw 370 
24 non-words (e.g., µcurtesins¶). The non-words were created to also match the criteria above. 371 
One of the four primes was presented, including divine, artificial, and natural entities, as well as 372 
¶principal resume¶ as the control prime, before each target word. Thus, each participant 373 
responded to 192 experimental trials in total. Each prime was presented for each target word. 374 
The list of words presented and their characteristics are available via Open Science Framework: 375 
https://osf.io/uzpjn/ 376 
The experiment commenced, with a trial block consisting of two neutral words and two 377 
neutral non-words. Each trial followed the same procedure with a fixation cross displayed for 200 378 
ms, followed by a mask composed of ³´ signs which was displayed for 500ms. At last, the 379 
prime was presented for 250 ms. The mask reappeared for 500 ms after which followed the target 380 
word, displayed for 3000 ms or until the response. A blank screen was displayed for 100 ms to 381 
end the trial (see Figure 2). The experiment was programmed using E-prime 2. 382 
 383 
                                                   
4 In the pretest, participants had to rate whether words (neutral and religious) displayed in a random 
order were referring to the concept of religion oQDVFDOHJRLQJIURP³QRWDWDOO´WR³WRWDOO\´5HVXOWV
showed a significant semantic association difference to religion difference between neutral and 
religious words (F(1,19)=11679,25, p<.001, Șðp=.99). 
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 384 
Fig.2. The running order of a trial.  385 
3.3 Results 386 
One participant was excluded from the analysis because of an error rate (i.e., the 387 
frequency of errors) superior to 30%. Errors occurred in 7.25% of the trials (633 trials out of 8736) 388 
and were analysed independently (all ps >.05). Correct trials with a reaction time (RT) of over 389 
three standard deviations in any of the experimental conditions were considered outliers and 390 
were excluded from the main analyses (.09% of the trials).  391 
Divine semantic bias. A 2 (Target Word: divine, neutral) x 4 (Prime: divine, artificial, 392 
natural, control) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to LQYHVWLJDWHZKHWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶393 
RT to respond to the religious target word was significantly faster after divine and artificial primes 394 
compared to natural and control ones (Table 1 for descriptive statistics). There was a significant 395 
Target Word x Prime interaction on RT, F(3, 46) = 5.12, p = .044, Șðp = .16. Preceded by divine 396 
entity prime, divine target words were identified as words faster than neutral words, F(1, 48) = 397 
9.32, p = .004, Șðp = .19. This pattern also occurred for artificial entity prime, F(1, 48) = 11.36, p = 398 
.001, Șðp = .19, but not when the target divine and neutral words were preceded by the natural 399 
entity prime, F(1, 48) = .57, p = .455, Șðp = .01, or the control prime, F(1, 48) = .03, p = .872, Șðp < 400 
.01. 401 
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Table 1 402 
Mean correct response times (in milliseconds) and standard errors (in parentheses) as a function of the 403 
Type of stimuli and the Prime type. 404 
Primes Targets RT Mean RT SE 
RT differences 
between targets  
     
Divine 
entities 
neutral 
words 
662 (20.8) 
p = .004               
 ȘðS = .16 divine    
words 
603 (29.0) 
Artificial 
entities 
neutral 
words 
652 (19.4) 
p = .001               
 ȘðS = .19 divine    
words 
593 (29.2) 
Natural 
entities 
neutral 
words 
653 (18.7) 
p = .455        
ȘðS = .01 divine    
words 
645 (20.0) 
Control  
neutral 
words 
662 (18.5) 
p = .872       
ȘðS < .01 divine    
words 
660 (20.0) 
 405 
We conducted a second repeated measure analysis on the RT differences between divine 406 
words and neutral words with a difference score computed from RT divine words minus RT 407 
neutral words (see Figure 3). Lower score indicated quicker identification of divine words 408 
following the prime. There were three planned contrasts corresponding to our hypotheses 409 
comparing 1) artificial and divine entity primes, 2) natural entity to control primes, and 3) 410 
artificial/divine entities primes average to natural entity/control primes average (see Figure 3 for 411 
distribution of scores). Results showed no significant differences in identifying neutral versus 412 
divine target words between Artificial entity and Divine entity prime conditions (t(48) = .01, 413 
p=.995, Șðp < .01; Contrast 1) as well as between Natural entity and Control prime conditions 414 
(t(48) = -.36, p=.718, Șðp < .01; Contrast 2). However, we found that participants identified divine 415 
target words significantly faster than the neutral target words following the combined average of 416 
artificial and divine entity primes compared to the combined average of natural entity and control 417 
condition primes (t(48) = -2.96, p=.005, Șðp = .04), lending support for our hypothesis that divine 418 
and artificial entities are semantically related.  419 
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 420 
Fig. 3. Distribution of differences in RTs between divine and neutral target words according to the 421 
four prime categories. A lower score indicates quicker identification of divine target word in 422 
comparison to the neutral word. Note: The box represents the lower and upper quartile and the 423 
horizontal line denotes median.  424 
3.4 Discussion 425 
The second study aimed to investigate whether the similar representation of artificial entities 426 
(i.e., AI, robots) and divine entities (i.e., gods) was based on a semantic association between the 427 
two categories. Results showed that both artificial and divine entities are indeed related to the 428 
semantic divine category, while this was not the case for natural entities (i.e., humans, animals). 429 
Our results demonstrate a semantic proximity between artificial and divine entities. This supports 430 
the idea that abstract nature of these artificial entities encourages individuals to refer to conceptual 431 
constructs of other abstract entities, such as divine entities, as an inference to create a 432 
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representation of AI and robots. 7KLV FRQFHSWXDO ³ERUURZLQJ´FRXOG be promoted by the similar 433 
presentation of fear and allure for AI and robots in pop-culture. 434 
4. General discussion 435 
  $FURVVWZRVWXGLHVZHKDYHGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKHUHDUHVLJQLILFDQWRYHUODSVLQSHRSOH¶V436 
representations of artificial entities, such as robots and AI, and those of divine entities. Study 1 437 
showed that people hold similar attitudes to robots and AI. These attitudes were considerably 438 
similar to those held towards divine entities such as Gods, but there were no similarities with 439 
humans or animals. Study 2 further demonstrated that this explicit link is also present at a more 440 
implicit level. We showed that semantic activation of categories relating to divinity as well as 441 
artificial entities increased recognition of semantic related divine words compare to neutral words, 442 
highlighting that these categories are semantically related. Our studies provide new evidence that 443 
people perceive artificial entities in ways to how they reason about divine entities, as both of 444 
these entities are semantically related. According to both study 1 and study 2 results, artificial 445 
entities are not defined as new form of divine entities but rather as sharing a common semantic 446 
representation with divine entities. As proposed by Durkheim the distinction between the sacred 447 
and the profane is often independent of the idea of divine entities (Durkheim, 1912). As with the 448 
FRQFHSWRI³*RG´WKHFRQFHSWVRIURERWVDQG$,FRXOGKDYHEHHQLQWURGXFHGLQWRWKHFDWHJRU\RI449 
sacred concepts as. This approach is interesting regarding the social nature of the representation 450 
RIWKHVDFUHG:KDWLVGHILQHGDV³VDFUHG´DULVHIURPFROOHFWLYHVWDWHVKDUHGHPRWLRQVIHHOLQJVRU451 
interests and, contrary to the profane, do not arise from sensorimotor experience. Actually, robots 452 
and AI are uncommon for most people. As we said their representation arise from a shared 453 
culture rather than own experience which echoes the view of the sacred as an intrinsic social 454 
concept. 455 
By investigating representations of AI and robots LQSHRSOH¶VPLQGV, our research 456 
contributes to the growing literature on human-robot interactions and especially the perception of 457 
artificial agents (Ray, Mondada, & Siegwart, 2008). It is advancing knowledge on the type of 458 
impressions that an average individual can create about artificial entities, which have a growing 459 
influence in our societies. Our studies support the notion that, being a relatively new addition to 460 
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everyday life, people use the impressions of other entities when they make sense of these new 461 
artificial entities. This is in line with the theoretical frameworks arguing that humans are natural 462 
meaning makers (Janoff-Bulan, 2010), seeking to avoid uncertainty (Rosen & Donley, 2006).  463 
Given the complexity of the artificial entities technological capacities topic, science-fiction 464 
productions could be a tool to slowly introduce the representation and structuring of such 465 
concepts. When building a representation of a non-human entity, we make use of all the 466 
information that we possess to build a more complete, coherent, and stable representation - 467 
especially when we manipulate abstract concepts, such as divine entities or AI. This perception of 468 
power above human power seems shared with artificial entities as agents with unknown limits, 469 
especially when we talk about the all-knowing AI. Interestingly, in study 1 we found a relationship 470 
between the tendency to be a technology pioneer and a negative attitude toward AI and robots 471 
but not divine entities. This result could mean that people who are more interested in technology 472 
could also be more inclined to imagine the potential threatening effects of AI and robots. The 473 
effect would probably occur only until a certain level of knowledge about these technologies is 474 
reached. In other words, looking at artificial intelligence without fully understanding it would be 475 
more anxiety-provoking than not being interested in it. This hypothesis supports the idea that the 476 
definition of AI and robots concepts is mainly driven, for laymen, by the society itself that imposes 477 
its fears because of the disruptive nature of these technologies. Since the potentialities and the 478 
understanding of these potentialities seem out of reach or understanding, a tension is created in 479 
the face of fear of loss of control granting AA with excessive power. 480 
$QRWKHUSRVVLELOLW\FRPHVIURPWKH³OLNHPH´K\SRWKHVLV(Costa, Abal, López-López, & 481 
Muinelo-Romay, 2014). According to this view, psychology is constructed on the apprehension 482 
WKDWRWKHUVDUHVLPLODUWRWKHVHOI,QWHUSHUVRQDOUHODWLRQVUHO\RQWKHEDVLFSHUFHSWLRQ³+HUHLV483 
something like me«´ With regards to human development, it is a prime tool for categorization. 484 
This process is involved in our learning process - especially through imitation - to distinguish 485 
between targets as potential models and to understand their underlying intentions (Meltzoff, 486 
2007). Based on this proposal, we could hypothesize that the explicit (i.e., cluster distance) and 487 
implicit (i.e., semantic distance) conceptual overlap between artificial and divine entities would not 488 
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EHDVSHFLILFOLQNEHWZHHQWKHPEXWD³QRWOLNHPH´LH, not human) classification. Regarding the 489 
first study, participants could have taken the evaluation of humans as the central point and 490 
created a cluster according to the proximity between this central point and other entities (i.e., 491 
divine entities, artificial entities, robots, and animals). The result would have been the perception 492 
of artificial and divine entities as more distant because they were not ³natural´DFFRUGLQJWRWKH493 
Study 1 dendogram, animals remained closer to humans than any other entities). In sum, the 494 
process could involve two parameters. )LUVWHYHU\HQWLW\FRQVLGHUHGDVQRW³OLNHPH´DQG495 
reaching a certain conceptual distance threshold with the observer could be judge as similar to 496 
other entities sharing the same state. Second, the attribution of fear and allure characteristics 497 
would not be a specific divine perception but an expectation of positive and negative outcomes of 498 
the presence of these entities when lacking in information about such agents. Further research 499 
will be needed to investigate this proposition. 500 
There are important implications for this research. Our results argue that Artificial Agents 501 
should be considered as a social and sociological phenomenon (Woolgar, 1985). Several issues 502 
emerge regarding the resilient adaptability of social systems in this technological change. These 503 
AA will probably contribute to major transformations when it comes to the ways we live, think and 504 
FRPPXQLFDWH7KXVTXHVWLRQVXFKDV³ZKDWH[DFWO\LV$,DVDVRFLDOSKHQRPHQRQ"´ZLOOKDYHWR505 
be answered 0O\QiĜ, Alavi, Verma, & Cantoni, 2018). Furthermore, technological entities such 506 
as robots and AI are irreversibly continuing to develop and it is in the common best interest that 507 
their functions and aims remain aligned with those of humans. If artificial entities are perceived as 508 
similar to gods in terms of their potential power, this can manifest itself in two different ways 509 
according to previous research: as punitive or as benevolent (Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2013). 510 
There is a danger that if artificial entities are perceived as punitive, this can be a source of threat 511 
to people and even encourage non-moral behaviours towards robots and AI. Thus, it is in the 512 
PDQXIDFWXUHUV¶EHVWLQWHUHVWWRSXVKIRUSURGXFLQJWHFKQRORJ\WKDWLVEHQHYROHQWDQGQRQ-513 
threatening. At the same time, policy makers need to debate the legal status of technological 514 
entities as their advancement continues (Spatola & Urbanska, 2018). 515 
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The mechanisms and explanations behind the semantic connection between artificial and 516 
divine entities still need to be addressed. In line with previous research (Epley et al., 2007; Waytz, 517 
Cacioppo, et al., 2010), we could assume that the development of knowledge about these 518 
artificial agents could reduce this divine perspective of AI and robots. Indeed, it would not be 519 
necessary to rely on other representation while we possess already stable and reliable 520 
representation. Thus, accessibility of agent representations should influence the type of 521 
attributions made and the tendency to perceive them as more or less powerful or as entities with 522 
a will (Medin & Atran, 2004). As a consequence, for experts, the overlap between divine and 523 
artificial entities should not occur.  524 
Second, cultural understanding of religion could highly influence the perception of AI and 525 
robots especially regarding the positive or negative attitude that may arise from human-robot 526 
interactions (Bartneck et al., 2007). For example, religious culture might have had an influence on 527 
the development of robot culture in countries like Japan (MacDorman, Vasudevan, & Ho, 2009; T. 528 
Nomura, Kanda, Suzuki, & Kato, 2005; Robertson, 2007). While Western culture has been 529 
influenced more by Christian teachings in which there is no specific spiritual consideration of 530 
objects, the same does not hold true for other countries where Buddhist and Confucian teachings 531 
are traditionally dominant. In these belief systems, spirits may live in objects, and thus, divine 532 
figures can be more easily associated with embodied structures or technological entities in 533 
general. Interestingly, while Western cultures do not have this representation of divine structures 534 
in objects, we nonetheless found a semantic overlap between the two structures in our two 535 
experiments with Western participants. Thus, we could hypothesise that, intrinsically, artificial 536 
intelligences and robots are not considered simple objects, even for Christianity-influenced 537 
cultures. In addition, we could assume that the divine overlap for AI and robots should be 538 
strengthened in Japanese culture because of the initial tendency to see objects as potential spirit 539 
vessels. It would be interesting to investigate these differences across cultures considering that 540 
while robots may be present worldwide, their consideration may deeply change from one culture 541 
to another. As a consequence, acceptance of them may also vary across cultures. 542 
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There were several limitations to our research. Firstly, the scale measuring attitudes 543 
towards entities was designed to measure attitudes towards gods specifically, and thus the range 544 
of attitudes that we measured were limited. It is possible that more links between robots, AI and 545 
other entities exist, but that these were not detected by our current measure. Therefore, we 546 
cannot rule out that artificial entities may be explicitly represented similarly in other ways. 547 
Secondly, while demonstrating the overlap between artificial and divine entities and hypothesising 548 
that these could be due to ambiguous feelings of both a positive and possibly threatening nature, 549 
we did not explicitly test whether these mechanisms could be account for in the present research. 550 
Thirdly, our sample was principally female and several studies demonstrated a gender effect on 551 
attitudes toward robots (Echterhoff, Bohner, & Siebler, 2006; Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Hegel, & De 552 
Ruiter, 2012; Tatsuya Nomura, Kanda, & Suzuki, 2006). For instance, individuals experienced 553 
more psychological closeness to a same-sex robot than toward a robot of the opposite sex and 554 
most people report a preference for human avatars that matched their gender (Nowak & Rauh, 555 
2005). This gender effect could affect the representation of AA and thus the semantic network 556 
associated. Thus, it could be interesting to control this factor in a subsequent study investigating 557 
the implicit representation of AA.  Finally, our samples included mainly young people who would 558 
have more exposure to technology. This would mean that their representations of artificial entities 559 
could well differ to those of other generations who are not as familiar with technologies. Using 560 
samples that are more representative would be informative in delineating whether the 561 
representations of divine and artificial entities overlap universally. However, according to Epley 562 
and colleagues, higher exposure to technology should result in higher knowledge about this 563 
technology and thus less belief in AA superpower (Epley et al., 2007). Therefore we can 564 
formulate two hypotheses: either the relation between the level of knowledge about AA and 565 
attitudes follow a Log-Normal distribution or a Benktander type II distribution. Further research 566 
including people presenting all the spectrum of knowledge should have to emphasize this issue. 567 
Conclusion 568 
Regardless of whether anthropomorphism or deism is the underlying attribution process, the 569 
way we accept and act with AI and robots will depend greatly on the representations we develop. 570 
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It is interesting to see that in our ever faster developing technological society, these representations 571 
can be guided by information from fiction and positive or negative expectations, even if AI and 572 
robots become more and more present in our everyday life. This supports the idea of working to 573 
support the pedagogy of this AI and robots revolution in order to ensure a more positive adaptation 574 
between human and artificial entities.  575 
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